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Individuals are living longer. A recent ONS report estimated a
male aged 65 in the UK in 2002 was estimated to live for 16 addi-
tional years i.e. to die at 81, whereas a male aged 65 in 2010 was
estimated to live until the age of 83 (ONS, 2011). Increasing life
expectancy has a number of implications for society. Given that
many individuals retire at or before retirement age in the UK
(Banks and Smith, 2006), central government is primarily focused
on reducing the detrimental effects population ageing can have
on ﬁscal expenditure. One route by which this can be achieved is
through higher rates of labour supply, in particular at older ages.
Therefore research which investigates this topic is of vital impor-
tance. In a standard lifecycle framework one would expect male
labour supply to be an inverse U shape over an individual’s life-
course, in particular one would expect to see a gradual (phased)
decline from work to retirement. The social norm associated with
retirement in the UK is the cessation of a career job, which is
reﬂected in a sharp reduction in hours worked (Kohli et al.,
1991; Banks and Smith, 2006). However, over the last thirty years
empirical research (largely coming from the US) has shown a
growing heterogeneity in labour supply at older ages (Hanoch
and Honig, 1985; Rust, 1989; Ruhm, 1990; Blau, 1994; Gustman
and Steinmeier, 2002 and Mastrogiacomo, 2003). These papers
have documented the rise of early retirement, which is also rela-
tively common in the UK and partial retirement which is less com-
mon in the UK relative to the US and selected European economies
(Gielen, 2009; Jones et al., 2010; Kantarci and Van-Soest, 2008).
However many studies either assume retirement is an absorbing
state or note that a proportion of individuals returns to the labourmarket (and whose ﬂows are non-trivial in magnitude) but choose
not to investigate them.One exception here is the early study by
Parker (1980) who explicitly considers retirement preferences
amongst a group of retired British individuals and explicitly asks
respondents about their attitudes towards working in retirement.
Other notable exceptions include Gustman and Steinmeier (2002)
and more recently, Congdon-Hohman (2009), Maestas (2010),
Cahill et al. (2010) and Kutlu-Koc (2014) who investigate various
aspects of unretirement in the US.
The focus of this paper is to understand the determinants of
unretirement behaviour in England. To do this I use the English
Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA) and restrict my attention to
men who are initially observed to be in retirement.1 This marks a
departure from the majority of existing studies which have tended
to focus on unretirement behaviour amongst individuals who are
initially employed. Few studies have focused on post retirement
labour supply conditional on initially being in retirement. Recent
exceptions include Larsen and Pedersen (2013) who use Danish
administrative register data to show that the probability of being
in paid work post (normal) retirement age is higher for: Males
who own their own home, have made higher pension contributions
during their lifetime and are better educated. Pettersson (2011)
investigates unretirement behaviour in Sweden using register data
and estimates an unretirement rate in the region of 6–14 per cent
depending on the deﬁnition of unretirement. Pettersson (2011)
found unretirement was more common amongst: The higher edu-
cated, early retirees, males and individuals with a spouse in the
labour force. These studies suggest unretirement is a lifestyle deci-
sion and not in general a response to negative ﬁnancial shocks.aid work
sis to be
2 I also estimate a version of our model including those aged up to 89 in wave 1 but
our results do not change. Moreover many of these individuals die over the sample
period and given their life stage do not exhibit unretirement behaviour.
2 R. Kanabar / The Journal of the Economics of Ageing xxx (2015) xxx–xxxThe most recent Census estimated 16.4 per cent of the popula-
tion in England was aged 65 and over in 2011, of which a signiﬁ-
cant proportion were in retirement (ONS, 2012).Therefore this
group represents a sizeable pool of untapped economic capacity
in England. Therefore the ﬁrst question I pose in this study is: con-
ditional on being is there duration dependence in the hazard of
unretirement? Understanding this has implications for policymak-
ers; for example current policies aim to delay entry into retire-
ment, such policies (which have been effective) are explicitly
targeting individual’s currently in employment. However policy-
makers should also think about policies which would boost
employment amongst individuals who are already in retirement.
Related to this point, is unretirement a realistic labour supply path
available to all individuals? If not, then it is important to under-
stand the characteristics that might prevent or hinder an individual
returning to work.
Analysis of ELSA suggests there is evidence of duration depen-
dence in unretirement. The pattern and direction indicate the haz-
ard of unretirement is highest for individuals in their mid-late 60s.
I also ﬁnd unretirement is more likely to occur amongst particular
sub-groups of the retired population. Characteristics which are
associated with raising the hazard of unretirement include: Being
highly educated, in good health, having a spouse in employment,
having always been single and prior to initial retirement occupied
a relatively highly paid job. My results suggest unretirement in
England is a lifestyle choice rather than due to credit constraints.
These ﬁndings support existing research investigating the charac-
teristics of individuals who work in retirement (Maestas, 2010;
Pettersson, 2011; Larsen and Pedersen, 2013).
I estimate that an unretirement job involves working on average
12 hours per week and weekly gross earnings from such employ-
ment amount to £128. Putting this into context, in the ﬁnancial cal-
endar year 2014–2015 the maximum weekly state pension an
individual could receive is £113. The Department for Work and
Pensions, which is responsible for social security payments in the
UK recently estimated nearly 1 in 5 retired individuals relied solely
on their state pension and beneﬁt income as sources of income in
retirement (DWP, 2011). Therefore an unretirement job can provide
a non-trivial source of additional retirement income, assuming the
opportunity to secure employment is equal across all individuals.
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section ‘Data’
describes ELSA the longitudinal panel dataset used in this paper.
Section ‘Unretirement in a theoretical framework’ considers the
main developments in modelling labour supply at older ages and
how unretirement behaviour can be explained in such frameworks.
Section ‘Speciﬁcation and modelling approach’ discusses the mod-
elling approach. Section ‘Estimation results’ presents estimation
results. Section ‘Characteristics of unretirement jobs’ analyses the
characteristics of unretirement jobs. Section ‘Conclusion and policy
implications’ concludes and considers policy implications.
Data
Sample
The sample used in this study is drawn from ELSA. ELSA is a bien-
nial longitudinal survey speciﬁcally aimed at investigating the lives
of individuals aged 50 and over in England. The survey is a joint col-
laboration between the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), University
College London (UCL), National Centre for Social Research (NCSR)
and The University of Manchester. The survey sample was drawn
from the Health Survey for England (HSE), with individuals and
their spouses being eligible to take part in the survey if they live
in private households in England and were aged 50 and above on
1st March 2002. The initial sample consisted of 11,391 core mem-
bers, for a detailed description of the data see Appendix A.Please cite this article in press as: Kanabar, R.. The Journal of the Economics oI follow individuals between wave 1 and wave 6 of the study
which corresponds to the time period 2002–2013. The stock sam-
ple is restricted to individuals who report being in retirement in
the ﬁrst wave of observation (wave 1) and are between 50 and
75 years of age at the time of their wave 1 interview.2 The median
age of sample members in wave 1 is 68 and the median age at which
they retired is 60. Sample distributions of these characteristics can
be found in Fig. A1 in Appendix A. These ﬁgures highlight the extent
of early retirement in England, which has been well documented in
the literature (Jones et al., 2010; Banks and Smith, 2006). Appendix B
also highlights that a large number of retirement episodes occur at
ages 59/60 and 65; this coincides with the age at which females
and males are eligible to claim their state pension age, this ﬁnding
mirrors existing studies using British longitudinal panel data to anal-
yse retirement from the labour market (Jones et al., 2010; Banks and
Smith, 2006).
After placing the sample restrictions and cleaning the data I am
left with an unbalanced panel of 941 individuals. I do not allow for
re-entry after an individual has attrited from the survey.
Deﬁnition of unretirement
My deﬁnition of unretirement relies on observing: (1) the
re-entry date to the labour market or (2) a change in a respondent’s
economic status between any two consecutive waves of the survey.
Consider (1) ﬁrst, at wave one individuals who reported them-
selves as retired were asked to provide the month and year in
which they retired. At each wave of ELSA respondents are asked
whether they consider themselves to be in paid work. If a respon-
dent answers yes then they are asked the month and year they
started working. This allows me to derive information regarding
the number of years spent in retirement prior returning to work.
One important consideration is how to account for unretirement
episodes which occurred before the sample period but after initial
retirement; this would lead to an underestimation of the true
extent of unretirement. This is commonly referred to as ‘delayed
entry’ or ‘left truncation’. In Section ‘Discrete time hazard model’
I discuss how the modelling approach deals with this problem to
ensure my estimates are not downward biased.
The second way an individual can be classiﬁed as unretired is if
they report a change in their economic status, for example if an
individual makes the transition from retirement to employment
across any two consecutive waves of the survey (this approach
has been used in previous studies of unretirement see inter alia
Maestas, 2010). I cross check both deﬁnitions to ensure I do not
double count unretirement episodes and also to ensure I only
investigate the ﬁrst episode of unretirement. Individuals who
unretire under deﬁnition (2) and are not captured under deﬁnition
(1) are assumed to have returned to the labour market at the mid-
point between the two (survey) waves in question.
Under my deﬁnition of unretirement 5.31 per cent of the sam-
ple exhibit such behaviour.An alternative deﬁnition of unretire-
ment could be based on the number of hours reported working
in paid employment. The aim of this paper is to focus on the pat-
tern and direction of duration dependence of unretirement and
therefore I choose a deﬁnition of unretirement which captures this.
Moreover, I would argue it is preferable to use a combination of
measures that captures an individual’s own perception of their
attachment to the labour market, given the existence of social
norms in retirement. For example, an individual may not consider
himself being in employment even if he is engaged in paid work
post retirement (Kohli et al., 1991).f Ageing (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2015.05.002
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In order to understand more about the unretirement decision
one should consider the reason behind the initial decision to retire.
This is important to ensure that unretirement is not simply an arte-
fact of the data, for example if an individual was forced to retire by
their employer and subsequently returned to work.
Involuntary retirement. Until April 2011 UK retirement legis-
lation meant employers had the power to force their workers to
retire once they became eligible to claim a state pension (BIS,
2010).3 The sample period in this study spans 2001 and 2013 there-
fore for a signiﬁcant proportion of the sample period an individual
who wanted to continue to work past the State Pension Age (SPA)
against the will of their employer would exhibit unretirement beha-
viour. Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2010) investigate the extent of volun-
tary and involuntary retirement in 19 (mostly advanced)
economies. Their study found that amongst individuals who retired
early in Great Britain one third did so involuntarily. The ELSA survey
asks respondents if they retired early and if this was the case then
what the main reason was for early retirement. I investigate the
main reason for early retirement (if applicable) for sample members
at wave 1 i.e. when in retirement, analysis indicates 12.57 per cent of
the sample who retired early did so involuntarily. Whilst this ﬁgure
is not as high as that found in Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2010) this still
highlights the extent of involuntary retirement in England.4 What is
important for this study is the proportion of the unretired sample
that were forced to retire early. I ﬁnd that none of the unretired sam-
ple reported they were forced to take involuntary early retirement.
Therefore unretirement ﬂows are not due to individuals being forced
to retire and then simply returning to work.
The budget set. In the option value approach of Stock and Wise
(1990) the decision to stay in work or retire involves comparing
the present value of working an extra day versus retiring today.
In evaluating future income streams part of the decision to unretire
is therefore likely to be related to the marginal tax rate an individ-
ual faces if they return to work. As of April 1989 the UK govern-
ment abolished the so called ‘earnings rule’ which charged
prohibitively high tax rates on labour market income earned by
individuals who chose to work past SPA (Bozio et al., 2010).5,6
Disney et al. (2002) show strong income effects in operation in
response to the abolishment of the earnings rule, male weekly hours
in employment increased by on average 4 hours.Unretirement in a theoretical framework
Traditional models of labour supply, including many versions of
the lifecycle model assume retirement is an absorbing state; this
largely reﬂected the behaviour observed in empirical data when
these models were ﬁrst developed. However beginning in the3 This law held for both men and women despite their state retirement age being
ﬁve years apart.
4 The differences may well be due to cohort and sample composition effects.
5 Of course pension income is taxable and any labour market income may push an
individual over a particular threshold which means they face a higher tax rate on part
of their (total) income.
6 Between 1948 and 1989, if an individual wanted to claim their state pension
within ﬁve years of retiring they had to terminate regular employment. Speciﬁcally,
an individual was not allowed to claim state pension if they worked more than
12 hours per week. If the number of hours an individual worked was less than this
threshold and earned above a certain higher limit (similar to the Higher Earnings
Limit), their state pension was reduced accordingly. Between 1948 and 1958 the taper
rate was 100%, between 1958 and 1989 it was reduced to 50%, and increased to 100%
for earnings over the HEL. This was seen as very detrimental to work incentives for
older people. In 1989 the earnings rules described above were abolished. Pension
income and earnings from employment whilst in retirement are now taxed at a rate
similar to that of the general working age population (there are some earnings rules
still in place but these refer to dependents additions, pensions may also be available
to increase their tax free allowance). For more information see Bozio et al. (2010).
Please cite this article in press as: Kanabar, R.. The Journal of the Economics o1970s studies using US individual-level survey data showed males
exhibiting unretirement or ‘reverse ﬂow’ behaviour. Subsequently
models such as those proposed by Gustman and Steinmeier (1984),
Gustman and Steinmeier (1984) and Rust (1989) were developed
to account for such a phenomenon.7 These frameworks predict
unretirement takes place only if it was optimal to do so i.e. the indi-
vidual derives higher utility by returning to work. This is similar to
the option value approach developed by Stock and Wise (1990)
except in their framework they model the initial decision to retire
and unretirement in their framework is not possible.8
Previous country-level studies using longitudinal survey data to
investigate unretirement have found such behaviour is in general
not due to ﬁnancial shocks but is either planned or a lifestyle deci-
sion. This would suggest that for these individuals the utility of
being in work was higher than staying in retirement. Whilst there
are some differences in the institutional framework in the coun-
tries where these studies have been carried out, it is unlikely they
are signiﬁcant; for example even in the US basic healthcare
becomes free for individuals once they turn 65.9
The estimation strategy allows me to determine which factors
are important in raising the hazard of unretirement. It is likely
these factors are correlated with how individuals rank alternative
situations such as being in work or retirement and is therefore
related to the underlying utility of each regime. It is also possible
to investigate the speed at which unretirement takes place follow-
ing initial retirement, economic theory would predict that if unre-
tirement did not conform to preretirement expectations (although
existing evidence suggests this is not the case) then an individual
would return to work soon after initial retirement. Alternatively
a slow return to work may suggest individuals gradually make this
decision as they receive more information, or require a break
before returning to work.Speciﬁcation and modelling approach
Covariate information set
Table 1 lists the covariates used in the discrete time hazard
model. The speciﬁcation combines a mixture of economic and
sociodemographic covariates which have been cited as important
in determining labour supply behaviour at older ages (Jones
et al., 2010; Banks et al., 2005).10
The importance of health in modelling the retirement decision
of British men has been well documented (Jones et al., 2010). I con-
trol for individuals baseline self-reported health status and also the
number of limiting illnesses. One would expect an individual who
was in poorer health to be less likely to be able to unretire even if
he had a strong preference for work or was credit constrained.
I control for household characteristics such as baseline marital
status which is largely time invariant for this sample, with the
exception of becoming widowed. I also control for the baseline
labour force status of the spouse. Various studies have documented7 Such frameworks have also attempted to include additional features such as
pensions, uncertainty and spousal effects which have been shown to be important in
determining labour supply behaviour at older ages (Schirle, 2008; Gustman and
Steinmeier, 2009).
8 The authors argue unretirement is very unlikely in the US in terms of an
individual returning to work at the same ﬁrm. The basis for their argument relates to
social security rules in operation at the time.
9 Contrary to Maestas (2010) other studies have found evidence which suggests
health insurance plays an important role in the unretirement decision
(Congdon-Hohman, 2009).
10 In guiding the speciﬁcation described in Table 1 I tested alternative speciﬁcations
using BIC/AIC. Appendix B provides a formal description of how each of the variables
in Table 1 was coded for estimation purposes. The information was provided by
respondents at the time of their wave 1 interview (2002/2003).
f Ageing (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2015.05.002
Table 1
Covariate information set used in discrete time hazard model.
Sociodemographic variables
Marital status
Labour force status of spouse
Self reported health status
Whether has a limiting illness
Holds a degree (equivalent to 16 years f/t education)
Holds an A level (equivalent to 13 years f/t education)
Opportunity to work past retirement age
Whether respondent feels they do not have enough income
Short term ﬁnancial planning horizon: 1 day–3 months (base group)
Medium term ﬁnancial planning horizon: 1–3 years
Long term ﬁnancial planning horizon: 5 years+
Self reported social class by preretirement job occupation
Economic variables
Log of total pension wealth (IFS)
Non pension ﬁnancial wealth quintile
12 In deciding an appropriate modelling strategy I estimated static and sequential
models following the lines of Cahill et al. (2010), Pettersson (2011) and Maestas
(2010), however due to the main aim of the paper and sample size restrictions these
avenues were not explored further.
13 More precisely our baseline hazard is a function of age which has been adjusted
to account for the issue of left truncation caused by individuals who have retired prior
to entry into the study.
14 This is the analogous discrete time version to the continuous proportional hazard
model and is particularly suitable given the relatively low probability of observing an
episode of unretirement (Jenkins, 1997).
15 One trade off in accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in a random effects
framework is that survey weights cannot be accounted for in estimation.
16 I restrict our sample to those individual who ﬁrst retire between 50 and 75 and
therefore assume the baseline hazard is zero for ages below 50.
17 The method described in Cleves et al. (2002) is equivalent to assuming that
individuals could not have unretired in the period between initial retirement and the
ﬁrst time I observe them in the study because if this is the case, then an individual
would be in employment in 2002 and therefore not at risk (and would not be included
in the stock sample). This potentially ignores the scenario that an individual unretired
4 R. Kanabar / The Journal of the Economics of Ageing xxx (2015) xxx–xxxempirical evidence which suggests joint complementarities in lei-
sure amongst British couples and hence the co-ordination of the
timing of retirement (Disney et al., 2010; Cribb et al., 2014).
Schirle (2008) estimates 25 per cent of labour supply behaviour
of older British married men can be attributed to the labour force
status of his wife.
I also control for background characteristics such as an individ-
ual’s highest level of educational attainment, this is likely to be
strongly correlated with earnings over the lifecycle and pension
wealth and has been shown to important in determining an indi-
vidual’s standard of living in retirement (Bozio et al., 2010).
Education may also affect the chances of securing paid work post
retirement; consider the case where only highly educated individ-
uals have the necessary skill set to return to work. I also control for
the social class of the ﬁnal job prior to retirement, which is likely to
be correlated with lifetime labour market factors.
Individuals amass wealth over the lifetime. If unretirement is
due to ﬁnancial constraints such as inadequate wealth holdings
in retirement then it is important to control for this, although
recent empirical evidence suggests this is not the case (Crawford
and O’Dea, 2014). I control for this by including a dummy variable
corresponding to an individual’s quintile position in the
non-pension ﬁnancial wealth distribution in 2002.
The stock sample consists of individuals who are in retirement.
Maestas (2010) emphasises the role of retirement expectations and
ﬁnds evidence to support the view that unretirement in the US is a
largely planned event (made prior to initial retirement).
Expectations data it is not available for our stock sample, however
ELSA contains information on an individual’s stock of pension
wealth in their ﬁrst wave of observation. This variable summarises
an individual’s lifetime labour force attachment by capturing the
contributions made to private and public pensions.11
One reason for unretirement to take place is if individuals are
not ﬁnancially prepared for retirement. Empirical evidence from
the US suggests there is widespread ﬁnancial illiteracy amongst
individuals approaching retirement (Lusardi et al., 2007). One
proxy for ﬁnancial literacy is to control for individual’s subjective
ﬁnancial planning horizon. This is deﬁned by three categories
which reﬂect different time horizons. I investigate whether there
is any difference in unretirement behaviour conditional on how
forward looking individuals are in their ﬁnancial planning. It is11 For individuals aged over state pension age (assuming no deferral) one can
observe an individual’s income stream, a large proportion of this stream is from
private and state pension. By combining this with information about the number of
pensions and how much each pension is worth (both reported) it is possible to derive
a measure of the net present value of pension wealth in 2002. For individuals aged
below SPA the pension wealth measure assumes the individual retired in 2002 chose
to not make any more pension contributions. For more information regarding the
construction of the pension wealth variables see Appendix A and Banks et al. (2005).
Please cite this article in press as: Kanabar, R.. The Journal of the Economics olikely an individual’s ﬁnancial planning horizon is correlated with
their ﬁnancial literacy and therefore any differences by group pro-
vides me with some insight as to whether those individuals who
are forward looking in certain (important) aspects of their life are
more likely to unretire.Model speciﬁcation
Previous research has focused on a static or sequential method
such as a probit or multinomial logit framework to analyse the
unretirement decision (Cahill et al., 2010; Pettersson, 2011;
Maestas, 2010; Larsen and Pedersen, 2013). The approach of this
paper is to consider how the hazard of unretirement varies with
age.12,13 A natural way to consider this is in a duration framework;
this type of modelling strategy goes beyond static or sequential
frameworks in terms of allowing the reader to understand the
dynamics of labour supply behaviour post retirement.Discrete time hazard model
Imodel unretirement using a discrete time hazard model with a
complementary log–log link function, which has been extended to
account for individual level unobserved heterogeneity (Meyer,
1990).14,15 I assume unobserved heterogeneity is suitably captured
by a gamma distribution. To implement this model I use the pgm-
haz8 package in Stata written by Stephen Jenkins. A condition for
being eligible in the stock sample (and hence suitable for estimation
purposes) is that an individual self-reports being in retirement in
wave 1. To facilitate estimation data must be reorganised such that
each individual has a corresponding number of rows representing
how many periods he is at risk (for more information see inter alia
Jenkins, 1997 and Jones et al., 2010).16 As noted in Section ‘Deﬁniti
on of unretirement’ the estimation strategy must be adapted to
the control for the fact that I do not observe unretirement episodes
between the calendar year in which an individual retired and the
year in which they were ﬁrst observed in ELSA. Following Cleves
et al. (2002) left truncation in semi-parametric models requires
one to omit the subject from all analysis during the truncation per-
iod. In my speciﬁc case this means that when I deﬁne the time at
which an individual becomes ‘at risk’ I explicitly account for the per-
iod they have already been in retirement.17and subsequently transitioned back into retirement before the ﬁrst wave of the study.
This individual would contribute to the likelihood but only from the time he entered
the study onwards (as he is at risk from this point onwards). I can (partially)
investigate the extent to which unretirement took place between the year of
retirement and the study period using the retrospective employment history data
collected at wave 3 of survey. It turns out 12 individuals in our sample unretired in
this period. However this itself may be an underestimate because the life history
survey is only available for individuals who remained in the survey up to wave 3 and
gave consent to take part in the additional retrospective life history survey. It also
only contains information on jobs which were at least 6 months in duration.
f Ageing (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2015.05.002
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Fig. 1. Unretirement hazard curve.
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individuals into six groups: 51–55, 56–60, 61–65, 66–70, 71–75,
76–80 and 81–84. The reason for specifying a piecewise-constant
speciﬁcation is that it is only possible to identify the hazard of
unretirement at a particular age if and only if an unretirement epi-
sode is observed in the data. Given the relatively low number of
episodes observed in our sample additional grouping is required;
which implies that the unretirement hazard is constant within
each of the six groups. A fully non-parametric version of the model
was estimated (for ages at which unretirement was observed) and
showed a very similar trend to the piecewise-constant speciﬁca-
tion presented in Section ‘Estimation results’. Therefore by group-
ing individuals into age bands I am not ignoring any speciﬁc
changes occurring at particular ages in terms of duration
dependence.
The exposition of the modelling strategy presented below
draws heavily on Jenkins (1997), Jenkins (2004). The approach
assumes a proportional hazard: this implies the hazard ratio is
constant with respect to time. The starting values required for
the estimation of the initial values of the vector of parameters
bin the extended version of the model are taken from a version
of the model which assumes a Gaussian error term.
The proportional hazard is deﬁned as:
ki;t ¼ k0ðtÞe½x
0
i;t
bþlogðv iÞ ð1Þ
where k0ðtÞ is the baseline hazard, x0i;t is the value of individual’s
characteristics and b is the coefﬁcient vector. Here v i is a random
variable which follows a gamma distribution such that
v i  ð1;r2Þ. bk describes the proportional (time invariant) effect
on the hazard of a change in the corresponding covariate from zero
to one.18
The discrete time hazard of unretirement in the jth interval for
an individual who has survived up to that point is given by:
hj Xi;j
  ¼ 1 efe½X0i;jbþsj g ð2Þ
where:
sj ¼ log
Z f j
f j1
k0ðsÞds ð3Þ
where sj is the log of the difference between the integrated baseline
hazardk0ðtÞ evaluated at the end of the interval ðf j1; f j and the
beginning of the interval. This can be used to derive the discrete
time interval hazard function (Jenkins, 2004 pp. 41). More precisely,
sj highlights the pattern of duration dependence in the interval haz-
ard. I specify a semi-parametric piecewise-constant baseline hazard
to allow for ﬂexibility in the hazard function (Jenkins, 1997).
Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2010) show that by allowing for unob-
served heterogeneity and not assuming a parametric baseline haz-
ard, this mitigates the effects of potential bias in the duration
dependence and covariates. Moreover, such a speciﬁcation pro-
vides better validation for the detection and true extent of unob-
served heterogeneity relative to a tightly constrained parametric
model (Dolton and Van der Klaauw, 1995). Ignoring this would
lead to bias in the estimates of the duration dependence and time
invariant covariates due to the so called ‘weeding effect’ i.e. those
individuals who are less likely to unretire continue being observed
in the data for longer. The null hypothesis ‘H0: No evidence of
unobserved heterogeneity’ cannot be rejected at conventional
levels of signiﬁcance. Therefore the estimation results presented
in Section ‘Estimation results’ are based on the preferred speciﬁca-
tion controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.18 In the case where bk is a dummy variable.
Please cite this article in press as: Kanabar, R.. The Journal of the Economics oEstimation results
Non-parametric retirement survival curves
Fig. 1 depicts the relationship between an individual’s age and
the hazard of unretirement, restricted to individuals who exhibit
unretirement behaviour. The Kaplan–Meier plot has been adjusted
to account for the fact that individuals can only exhibit unretire-
ment behaviour once they entered the study.
Fig. 1 indicates three quarters of unretirement episodes
occurred before SPA. The gradient of the hazard curve suggests
the likelihood of unretirement is relatively constant between ages
50 and 67. Further analysis indicates the median age at which ini-
tial retirement took place amongst the sample of individuals who
subsequently unretired was at 56 years of age, which suggests
unretirees tend to retire early. The absence of preretirement expec-
tations data means it is not possible to investigate whether unre-
tirement is a planned event (as in Maestas, 2010); however it is
possible to investigate which individual characteristics are impor-
tant in raising the hazard of unretirement; this in turn has implica-
tions for future policies aimed to boost labour supply in retirement.Discrete time hazard model
Table 2 describes the shape of the baseline hazard. The interpre-
tation of the coefﬁcient is deﬁned as the effect of a unit change on
the underlying (instantaneous) hazard of unretirement; the results
in Table 2 indicate the hazard of unretirement is low; however the
estimates are all statistically signiﬁcant.19 Moreover the pattern on
the duration dummies in the piecewise constant speciﬁcation
implies the baseline hazard of unretirement rises with age and is
highest for individuals in their late 60s after which point it generally
declines. Table 2 also indicates the presence of unobserved hetero-
geneity and hence the importance of controlling for it when estimat-
ing the baseline hazard and covariate effects.
I separate covariates into two categories: economic and
sociodemographic. Turning to the economic covariates ﬁrst,
Table 2 indicates that pension wealth does not have an effect on
the hazard of unretirement. This suggests unretirement is unlikely
to be due to credit constraints or sub-optimal retirement saving.
This is consistent with a recent paper by Crawford and O’Dea
(2014) who using administrative data linked to ELSA, show house-
holds born in the 1940s reach retirement with a level of wealth19 The duration dummies are also highly statistically different from one another.
f Ageing (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2015.05.002
Table 2
Discrete time hazard model of unretirement: ELSA male sample.
Hazard : expðbÞ b ra
Age bands
51–55 4.21e06⁄⁄ 12.37⁄⁄ 5.17
56–60 8.04e06⁄⁄ 11.73⁄⁄ 5.02
61–65 8.03e06⁄⁄ 11.73⁄⁄ 4.92
66–70 14.8e05⁄⁄ 11.12⁄⁄ 4.85
71–75 8.78e06⁄⁄ 11.64⁄⁄ 4.78
76–80 5.25e05⁄⁄ 9.85⁄⁄ 4.69
81–84 9.6e05⁄ 9.25⁄ 4.77
Economic controls
Log value of pension wealth in 2002 1.49 .39 .387
Non-pen pension wealth in 2002: Bottom quintile 0.59 .51 1.01
Non-pen pension wealth in 2002: 2nd quintile 0.89 .11 0.68
Non-pen pension wealth in 2002: 3rd quintile 0.62 .46 0.60
Non-pen pension wealth in 2002: 4th quintile 1.09 .08 0.47
Socio-demographic controls
Single 6.06⁄ 1.80⁄ 1.06
Married 1.22 0.20 0.88
Divorced .68 .38 1.45
Spouse in employment in 2002 10.45⁄⁄⁄ 2.34⁄⁄⁄ 0.49
Degree 5.16⁄⁄⁄ 1.64 0.66
A-level 3.35⁄⁄ 1.20 0.58
GCSE or CSE 2.17 0.77 0.62
Poor or fair health in 2002 .279⁄⁄ 1.27 0.62
Limiting illness in 2002 0.85 .162 0.38
Pre-retirement occupation
Professional/managerial .504 .68 0.70
Skilled non-manual/manual .86 .14 0.65
Opportunity to work past retirement age .29⁄ 1.23⁄ 0.72
Subjective controls
Not enough income 2.61 .96 0.72
Financial planning horizon
1< Medium<3 years .83 .18 0.56
Long: >5 years 1.58 .45 0.55
Test for individual speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity Implication:
H0: No evidence of individual speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity Reject H0
Person-year observations 13,331
Number of unretirement episodes 48
⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
Base categories excluded for estimation purposes: 5th quintile in non-pen pension wealth distribution in 2002; widowed; GCSE or below (including foreign qualiﬁcation);
semi-skilled or unskilled occupation; short-term ﬁnancial planning horizon (<1 year); no intercept model (in order to estimate all duration groups).
a Standard errors refer to estimates corresponding to b.
20 Indeed the mean age at wave 1 amongst individuals who reported themselves as
widowers is 3 years older than those who are single.
6 R. Kanabar / The Journal of the Economics of Ageing xxx (2015) xxx–xxxwhich is in excess of the optimal amount (in a lifecycle sense)
which is required to sustain their standard of living in and through
retirement. Their result holds even after accounting for the large
increase observed in the value of housing wealth over the past
30 years in England.
Table 2 indicates individuals who self-reported having poorer
health were signiﬁcantly less likely to unretire. The magnitude of
the effect was large; conditional on other controls the hazard of
unretirement for an individual with fair or poor health was 72
per cent lower than that of a person who reported good, very good
or excellent health. Jones et al. (2010) using the British Household
Panel Survey show a deterioration in health signiﬁcantly raises the
hazard of early retirement. The results in Table 2 support the view
that in addition to health playing an important role in affecting ini-
tial entry into retirement; it also affects the likelihood of post
retirement labour supply.
Table 2 shows the hazard of unretirement was 416 per cent
higher amongst individuals with a degree and 235 per cent for
those with an A-level, relative to individuals whose highest level
of educational attainment is an O or CSE-level qualiﬁcation.
Further investigation showed 65 per cent of the unretired sample
were educated to at least an A-level standard, which suggests the
individuals who unretired.in the sample were relatively well edu-
cated given their age cohort.Please cite this article in press as: Kanabar, R.. The Journal of the Economics oHousehold level information relating to baseline spousal
employment status indicates having a spouse in employment
raises the hazard of unretirement more than ninefold. The magni-
tude of this effect is twice that of having a degree. Existing research
has highlighted the importance of joint complementarities in lei-
sure in determining labour force participation (Banks et al., 2005;
Cribb et al., 2014). The results in Table 2 suggest such forces extend
into retirement and are also important in affecting unretirement
behaviour. Of course joint complementarities in leisure can only
exist if a partner is present. Table 2 also shows that (conditional
on other characteristics) relative to a widowed male an individual
who has always been single is signiﬁcantly more likely to unretire;
this could be capturing differences in the age composition of these
groups or lifestyle/social choices.20
I also control for subjective measures relating to an individual’s
ﬁnancial planning horizon and separately whether individuals felt
they did not have enough income. None of these were statistically
signiﬁcant, suggesting that if we are to believe ﬁnancial planning is
a proxy for ﬁnancial literacy then unretirement is not correlated
with such aspects of individual behaviour. Intuitively thosef Ageing (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2015.05.002
R. Kanabar / The Journal of the Economics of Ageing xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 7individuals who were given the opportunity to work past retire-
ment age prior to retirement were 79 per cent less likely to unre-
tire relative to those who were not. Inspection of the data revealed
that the median age of initial retirement for those who were given
the opportunity to work past retirement age was 3 years higher
than those who were not.21
Test for attrition bias I test for attrition bias using a variable
addition test ﬁrst proposed by Nijman and Verbeek (1992). This
is carried out by including a covariate in the information set which
corresponds to the number of survey waves an individual responds
to. Statistical signiﬁcance of this covariate would indicate evidence
of non-random attrition. I ﬁnd no evidence of this particular type of
attrition bias and the coefﬁcient estimates (not reported) changed
only marginally relative to those reported in Table 2 below.
Characteristics of unretirement jobs
At each wave of ELSA respondents are asked to give details
about their employment (conditional on reporting being in
employment) such as occupation, number of hours worked per
week and also their annual employment income. Analysing this
information based on our unretired sample indicates that an unre-
tirement job is largely standing or sedentary in nature, few individ-
uals engage in post-retirement employment which involves a
physical aspect.22
The intensity of work effort is important if we are to understand
the lifestyle and economic impact of unretirement jobs. The esti-
mates show the unretirement jobs typically entail an individual
working 12 h per week and earning a pre-tax weekly income of
£128.16 (2007 prices).23 Maestas (2010) ﬁnds a similar result in that
unretirement jobs are similar to partial retirement jobs in terms of
hours worked and amount earned, however it is worth noting the
prevalence of partial retirement is much lower in England than it
is in the US (Banks and Smith, 2006).
Another way to assess the importance of an unretirement job is
by comparing it to an individual’s main job prior to retirement. I
use retrospective employment history data collected at wave 3 of
ELSA. The median (pre-tax) salary earned by an unretiree was
£40,000 (2007 prices) in their main job prior to retirement.
Therefore, an unretirement job replaces 16.6 per cent of pre-tax
preretirement annual labour market income. This is a non-trivial
amount. A recent report by the Pensions Policy Institute (2013)
showed state pension (social security) income in the UK replaced
around 17.6 per cent of median earnings in 2013. Indeed, the
weekly state pension in the ﬁnancial calendar year April
2014-April 2015 for a single individual is £113.10 (DWP, 2015).
A report by the DWP (2011) highlighted 18 per cent of single pen-
sioners rely solely on state pension and beneﬁt income as sources
of income in retirement, therefore it is clear that an unretirement
job has the ability to provide an important source of additional
income.
The estimate of the preretirement median salary income
amongst the unretired sample highlights that these individuals
were unlikely to be concentrated in jobs in the lower end of the
income distribution. For example, median earnings amongst UK
male full time workers in 2007 were £26,300 (ONS, 2007). This is
only two thirds of the salary earned in the main preretirement21 The routing of this question is such that it is asked of all individuals who were
retired because they reached retirement age and were not made redundant.
22 It is worth keeping in mind that the analysis in this section is derived from
information provided by the 48 sample respondents who exhibited unretirement
behaviour.
23 Pension income is taxable therefore by engaging in paid employment implies
individuals will be making some contribution to ﬁscal revenues. The total amount of
additional tax contributions made depends on other sources of income in retirement
such as occupational and private pension, annuity and property income.
Please cite this article in press as: Kanabar, R.. The Journal of the Economics ocareer job for the sample of unretirees. This is consistent with
the conclusions drawn from Table 2 which implied that character-
istics correlated with unretirement suggest such behaviour is a
lifestyle choice and not a consequence of sub-optimal saving for
retirement.
Voluntary work
Voluntary work is another important aspect of retirement.
Individuals may choose to spend part of their time in the voluntary
sector in order to feel they are contributing to society or perhaps to
give an individual the opportunity to establish social networks
(Okun, 1994; Grifﬁn and Hesketh, 2008).
The ELSA survey asks individuals about the frequency at which
they carry out voluntary work. At wave 1 26 per cent of the sample
undertake voluntary work at least twice a month. This is in line
with a recent report by a national voluntary organisation nfp
Synergy, who using data from the UK Citizenship Survey estimate
30 per cent of individuals aged between 50 and 65 did informal or
formal volunteering at least once a month (Saxton, 2011).24
Therefore whilst the prevalence of unretirement in England is rela-
tively low compared to the US, this does not imply retired English
men withdraw from the labour market completely.
Conclusion and policy implications
The main focus of this study has been to establish the preva-
lence of unretirement amongst a sample of initially retired
English men, and understand how such behaviour varies with an
individual’s age and their economic and sociodemographic charac-
teristics. The results suggest the hazard of unretirement is highest
for individuals in their mid-late 60’s and that unretirement is a
type of behaviour more likely to be exhibited by individuals who
retired relatively early. The analysis suggests unretirement is not
in general a response to sub-optimal retirement saving, but instead
likely to be a lifestyle choice. This ﬁnding is in line with other stud-
ies investigating such behaviour in advanced economies (Maestas,
2010; Pettersson, 2011; Larsen and Pedersen, 2013).
This paper contributes to a scare and important literature con-
cerned with labour supply behaviour post retirement. I am aware
of no other studies that have investigated unretirement in the con-
text of England. The ﬁndings are of relevance to policymakers who
wish to minimise the detrimental effects of an ageing population.
Indeed, central governments have committed substantial resources
to develop or amend policies which aim to address this issue. The
UK government is no exception; various signiﬁcant reforms have
been introduced in the past decade. These include changes to the
age at which individuals can access their occupational pension
and the extent to which they can consume from such savings.25,26
There has also been a shift to focus on retirement saving through the
introduction of auto-enrolment in 2012. The idea is that individuals
are automatically enrolled into a workplace pension. Other measures
have focused on changing the UK social security system. This
includes an overhaul of the existing two-tier system to a single tier
system set to roll out in 2016, in addition to planned increases in the
age at which individuals are eligible to ﬁrst claim their state pension.
Finally, the generosity of state pension deferral which is currently in24 Estimates were obtained using data from the Citizenship Survey, National
Statistics April-September 2010. Sample size: 10,000 individuals with minimum
participation age of 16.
25 In order to reduce the incidence of early retirement observed in the 1990s the
Pensions Green Paper 2002 proposed a rise in the age at which an individual could
claim their occupational pension from 50 to 55 by 2010 (Blundell et al., 2002; Thurley,
2011).
26 As of April 2015 individuals are free to consume their pension pots as they wish
instead of purchasing an annuity.
f Ageing (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2015.05.002
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Fig. A1. Age at wave 1 and retirement age distributions.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics: ELSA male sample.
Variable Obs
(N).
Mean
proportion
Economic variables
Log present value of pension income 941 11.9
Bottom non-pension net ﬁnancial wealth quintile 941 0.105
2nd non-pension net ﬁnancial wealth quintile 941 0.14
3rd non-pension net ﬁnancial wealth quintile 941 0.19
4th non-pension net ﬁnancial wealth quintile 941 0.24
Top non-pension net ﬁnancial wealth 941 0.325
Sociodemographic variables
Age 941 67
Married 941 0.79
Single 941 0.07
Divorced/separated 941 0.07
Widowed 941 0.07
Spouse in employment 941 0.125
Whether has a limiting illness 941 0.59
Whether holds a degree 941 0.18
Whether holds an A-level or above 941 0.19
Whether holds an O-level or CSE 941 0.23
Opportunity to work past retirement age 941 0.12
Whether respondent feels they do not have enough
income
941 0.07
<1 year (short term) ﬁnancial planning horizon 941 0.30
3–5 years (medium term) ﬁnancial planning
horizon
941 0.40
5+ years (long term) ﬁnancial planning horizon 941 0.30
Self reported social class: professional/managerial 941 0.46
Self reported social class: skilled non-manual/
skilled manual
941 0.40
Self reported social class: semi-skilled or unskilled 941 0.14
8 R. Kanabar / The Journal of the Economics of Ageing xxx (2015) xxx–xxxexcess of 10 per cent per annum is being slashed from April 2016 by
one-half. These measures have been introduced with two core aims
in mind: To extend the working lives of citizens and/or reduce the
burden of increasing life expectancy on the state.
The policies outlined above are all generally aimed at cohorts
who are still of working age and have yet to reach retirement.
This is intuitive given the long term nature of pensions and the
effects of lifecycle labour supply on the standard of living in retire-
ment (Bozio et al., 2010; Bozio et al., 2011; Crawford and O’Dea,
2014). However the most recent Census highlighted that 1 in 6
individuals living in the UK in 2011 is aged over 65. This paper
has shown that unretirement is another potential route policymak-
ers can explore in order to extend working lives. Unretirement also
addresses the key issue of boosting income in retirement and
reducing pensioner poverty. The estimates indicate the weekly
income an individual can earn from an unretirement job is greater
than that received from a full state pension.
The results show unretirement behaviour in England is not con-
centrated amongst individuals who were in low paying jobs prior
to retirement. In fact prior to retirement, unretirees earned one
third more than male median earnings in 2007. It is likely these
individuals had a strong attachment to the labour force prior to
retirement. This is also supported by the fact that (given the
cohort) their spouse is still in the labour market. If these character-
istics are linked to how an individual evaluates his leisure, then
unretirement is consistent with a theoretical framework where
individuals are maximising their utility.
Looking ahead, it is likely that future cohorts of individuals
entering retirement will be in better health, be more highly edu-
cated and have a spouse in the labour market. The ﬁndings from
this paper imply that Ceteris paribus this should increase the
prevalence of unretirement in the future. However, other changes
in legislation relating to increases in the statutory retirement
age, improvements in age discrimination legislation and permit-
ting ﬂexible working hours at older ages mean individuals may
delay initial entry to retirement. However, what is inevitable is
that life expectancy will continue to rise and retirement policies
must be designed to facilitate labour supply paths at older ages.
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Appendix A. Data and sample construction: The English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing
The data utilised in this paper is drawn from the English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). ELSA is a biennial longitudinal
survey which is representative of the English household population
aged 50 and over. The ﬁrst wave of data was collected between
April 2002 and March 2003, and was drawn from multiple samples
(1998, 1999 and 2001) of the Health Survey for England (HSE). HSE
is a study conducted on behalf of the Department of Health by the
Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, UCL and the
National Centre for Social Research. The wave 1 sample consisted
of 12,099 individuals of whom 11,391 were core sample members,
these comprised of 7,894 beneﬁt units (i.e. an individual or couple
with dependents). Due to non-response and sample attrition
refreshment samples of individuals aged between 50 and 74 werePlease cite this article in press as: Kanabar, R.. The Journal of the Economics of Ageing (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2015.05.002
Table 4
Coding deﬁnitions used in estimation of discrete time hazard model.
Variable Deﬁnition
Single 1 if true, zero otherwise
Married 1 if true, zero otherwise
Divorced/separated 1 if true, zero otherwise
Spouse in employment 1 if true, zero otherwise
Whether has private health insurance 1 if true, zero otherwise
Whether has a limiting illness 1 if true, zero otherwise
Highest qualiﬁcation: Degree 1 if true, zero otherwise
Highest qualiﬁcation: A-level (but below degree) 1 if true, zero otherwise
Highest qualiﬁcation: O-level/CSE 1 if true, zero otherwise
Highest qualiﬁcation: Below O-level/CSE qualiﬁcation 1 if true, zero otherwise
Log pension wealth at wave 1 interview logðpension wealthÞ
2nd non-pension net ﬁnancial wealth 1 if true, zero otherwise
3rd non-pension net ﬁnancial wealth 1 if true, zero otherwise
4th non-pension net ﬁnancial wealth 1 if true, zero otherwise
4th non-pension net ﬁnancial wealth (base group) 1 if true, zero otherwise
Opportunity to work past retirement age 1 if true, zero otherwise
Whether respondent feels they do not have enough income 1 if true, zero otherwise
1 day– 3 months (short term) ﬁnancial planning horizon (base group) 1 if true, zero otherwise
1–3 years (medium term) ﬁnancial planning horizon 1 if true, zero otherwise
5+ years (long term) ﬁnancial planning horizon 1 if true, zero otherwise
Self reported social class: professional/managerial 1 if true, zero otherwise
Self reported social class: skilled non manual/manual 1 if true, zero otherwise
Self reported social class: non skilled/foreign qualiﬁcation (base group) 1 if true, zero otherwise
R. Kanabar / The Journal of the Economics of Ageing xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 9introduced to the main survey at wave 3 (2006/7), wave 4 (2008/9)
and wave 6 (2012/3). I do not make use of the refreshment sample
given the stock sampling approach used in this paper. At the time
of writing there were six waves of ELSA available (in addition there
is also a wave 0 ﬁle however this contains limited economic and
sociodemographic information).
ELSA collects a variety of information relating to an individ-
ual’s circumstances at the time of survey. This ranges from
detailed information regarding income, assets, employment, pen-
sions and also information relating to an individual’s health status
and medical conditions. Finally there is also a module relating to
future (subjective) expectations of paid work, health and life
expectancy. However, the routing of the questionnaire means I
do not have data on retirement expectations for the stock sample
of interest.
For the purpose of this paper it is the age at which unretirement
takes place which is of central importance. This is determined from
the following variables which are collected at wave 1 of ELSA:
1. Year of birth.
2. Age at wave 1 interview.
3. Calender month and year of retirement.
4. Calender month and year individual took up employment.
5. Calender month and year of wave 1 interview.
The difference between 4. and 3. denotes the period between retir-
ing and going back to work (if unretirement takes place).
Otherwise the difference between an individual’s age at the most
recent wave of observation and the age of retirement deﬁnes the
period spent in retirement. This is then combined with the age at
initial retirement. One remaining issue is to deal the fact that indi-
viduals become ‘at risk’ prior to observation in the study, in order
to ensure the estimates are not biased I follow Cleves et al., 2002
and drop all periods between initial retirement and the ﬁrst time
an individual is observed in the study (using 3. and 5. above).27 I
round this number to the nearest whole integer to facilitate estima-
tion of the discrete time hazard model.27 To ensure the baseline hazard is speciﬁed as a function of age, using the language
of Jenkins, 2008 the sequence variable is adjusted to account for an individual’s age
when they ﬁrst entered the study.
Please cite this article in press as: Kanabar, R.. The Journal of the Economics oI make use of the pension wealth variable constructed by the IFS
provided in the pension wealth variable dataset which accompa-
nies each release of the ELSA dataset. The exact measure is deﬁned
as the (log) of the sum of variables ‘pripenw1_2002’ and ‘state
penw1_2002’.28 For individual’s aged above SPA this is the sum of
the net present value of private and public pension income.
Therefore it does not include pension income which has been
deferred; however it is unlikely a large proportion of the sample
defers their pension or at least their state pension (Coleman et al.,
2008).For individuals aged below SPA their total pension wealth is
calculated using the information they have provided relating to the
worth of their pension pot(s) and the type(s) of pension scheme(s)
they are a member of. It is assumed that these individuals do not
make any further additional contributions to their pensions.
Finally it worth noting the use of the Financial Derived
Variables (FDV) dataset released with each wave of ELSA.
Speciﬁcally I use a measure of total non-pension household wealth
(by quintile) derived by the IFS. Total non-pension ﬁnancial wealth
is the sum of total net housing wealth and total net non-housing
wealth, this then gives a distribution across all beneﬁts units
(weighted to include sample members only and unequivalised) in
a given calendar year.A.1. Sample characteristics
The ﬁnal sample is comprised of 941 individuals for whom
there is complete information suitable for estimation purposes.
Covariates used in Table 2 correspond to information reported by
respondents at their wave 1 interview (2002/2003). Table 3 sum-
marises their average characteristics:Appendix B. Coding of variables used in discrete time hazard
model
Table 4 describes how each of the covariates in the information
set is coded for estimation purposes.28 Various assumptions are made regarding the annuity and discount rate see
Table 2 in Banks et al., 2005.
f Ageing (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2015.05.002
10 R. Kanabar / The Journal of the Economics of Ageing xxx (2015) xxx–xxxReferences
Banks, J., Smith, S., 2006. Retirement in the UK. Oxford Rev. Econ. Policy 22 (1), 40–
56.
Banks, J., Emmerson, C., Oldﬁeld, Z., 2005. Preparing for Retirement: The Pension
Arrangements and Retirement Expectations of Those Approaching State Pension
Age in England. IFS Working Papers W05/13.
BIS, 2010. Phasing Out the Default Retirement Age. Accessible via: https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/ﬁle/
31485/10-1047-default-retirement-age-consultation.pdf
Blau, D.M., 1994. Labor force dynamics of older men. Econometrica 62 (1), 117–156.
Blundell, R., Costas, M., Smith, S., 2002. Pension incentives and the pattern of early
retirement. Econ. J. 112, C153–C170.
Bozio, A., Crawford, R., Tetlow, G., 2010a. A History of the State Pensions in the UK:
1948–2010. IFS Brieﬁng Note BN105.
Bozio, A., Crawford, R., Emmerson, C., Tetlow, G., 2010b. Retirement Outcomes and
Lifetime Earnings: Descriptive Evidence from Linked ELSA–NI Data. Department
for Work and Pensions Working Paper No 81.
Bozio, A., Emmerson, C., Tetlow, G., 2011. How Much do Lifetime Earnings Explain
Retirement Resources? IFS Working Paper No. 11/02.
Cahill, K.E., Giandrea, M.D., Quinn, J.F., 2010. The Role of Re-entry in the Retirement
Process. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Working Paper 439.
Cleves, M., Gould, W., Gutierrez, R., 2002. An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using
Stata. Stata Press, College Station, TX.
Coleman, N., McLeod R., Norden, O., Coulter, A., 2008. State Pension Deferral: Public
Awareness and Attitudes. Department for Work and Pensions Research Report
No 526.
Congdon-Hohman, J.M., 2009. Three Essays in Labor and Public Economics.
University of Michigan, Unpublished PhD Thesis.
Crawford, R., O’Dea, C., 2014. Cash and Pensions: Have the Elderly in England Saved
Optimally for Retirement. IFS Working Paper (W14/22).
Cribb, J., Emmerson, C., Tetlow, G., 2014. Labour Supply Effects of Increasing the
Female State Pension Age in the UK from Age 60 to 62. IFS Working Papers
(W14/19).
Disney, R., Smith, S., 2002. The labour supply effect of the abolition of the earnings
rule for older workers in the United Kingdom. Econ. J. 112 (478), C136–C152.
Disney, R., Ratcliffe, A., Smith, S., 2010. Booms Busts and Retirement Timing. The
Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Working Paper No. 10/233.
University of Bristol.
Dorn, D., Sousa-Poza, A., 2010. ‘Voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ early retirement: an
international analysis. Appl. Econ. 42 (4), 427–438.
DWP, 2011. Pensions Act 2011. Summary of Impacts. Accessible via: https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/ﬁle/
181461/pensions-bill-2011-summary-of-impacts.pdf.
DWP, 2015. Ofﬁcial Website. Accessible via: <https://www.gov.uk/state-pension/
what-youll-get>.
Gielen, A.C., 2009. Working Hours Flexibility and Older Workers’ Labour Supply.
Oxford Economic Papers 61, 240–472. Oxford University Press.
Grifﬁn, B., Hesketh, B., 2008. Post-retirement work: the individual determinants of
paid and volunteer work. J. Occup. Organizational Psychol. 81 (1), 101–121.
Gustman, A.L., Steinmeier, T.L., 1984a. Retirement Flows. NBER Working Paper
1069.
Gustman, A.L., Steinmeier, T.L., 1984. Modeling the retirement process for policy
evaluation and research. Monthly Labor Rev. 107 (7), 26–33.
Gustman, A.L., Steinmeier, T.L., 2002. Retirement and the Stock Market Bubble.
NBER Working Paper Series No. 9404.
Gustman, A.L., Steinmeier, T.L., 2009. Integrating Retirement Models. NBERWorking
Papers 15607, National Bureau of Economic Research Inc.
Hanoch, G., Honig, M., 1985. Partial retirement as a separate mode of retirement
behavior. J. Human Resour. 20 (1), 21–46.Please cite this article in press as: Kanabar, R.. The Journal of the Economics oJenkins, S.P., 1997. Estimation of discrete time (grouped duration data) proportional
hazards: pgmhaz8. Stata Technical Bulletin, STB-39 (insert ‘sbe17’). StataCorp.
Jenkins, S.P., 2004. Survival Analysis. Unpublished Manuscript, Institute for Social
and Economic Research, University of Essex, Colchester, UK.
Jenkins, S.P., 2008. Survival Analysis Using Stata: Module EC968. Accessible via:
<http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/resources/survival-analysis-with-stata-module-
ec968>. Numerous Dates.
Jones, A.M., Rice, N., Roberts, J., 2010. Sick of work or too sick to work? Evidence on
self-reported health shocks and early retirement from the BHPS. Econ. Model.
27 (4), 866–880.
Kantarci, T., Van-Soest, A., 2008. Gradual retirement: preferences and limitations.
De Economist. Springer 156 (2), 113–144.
Kohli, M., Rein, M., Guillemard, A., van Gunsteren, H., 1991. Time for Retirement:
Comparative Studies of Early Exit from the Labor Force. Cambridge University
Press.
Kutlu-Koc, V., 2014. The Retirement-Consumption Puzzle and Unretirement.
Netspar Discussion Paper 11/2014-049.
Larsen, M., Pedersen, P.J., 2013. To work, to retire-or both? Labor market activity
after 60. IZA J. Eur. Labor Stud. 2, 21.
Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O.S., 2007. Baby Boomer retirement security: the roles
of planning, ﬁnancial literacy, and housing wealth. J. Monet. Econ. 54 (1),
205–224.
Maestas, N., 2010. Expectations and realizations of work after retirement. J. Human
Resour. 45 (3), 718–748.
Mastrogiacomo, M., 2003. On Expectations, Realizations and Partial Retirement.
Tinbergen Institute and Centraal Planbureau and University of Amsterdam
Discussion Paper 04-052/3.
Meyer, B.D., 1990. Unemployment insurance and unemployment spells.
Econometrica 58 (4), 757–782.
Nicoletti, C., Rondinelli, C., 2010. The (mis)speciﬁcation of discrete duration models
with unobserved heterogeneity: A Monte Carlo study. J. Econometrics 159 (1),
1–13.
Nijman, T., Verbeek, M., 1992. Nonresponse in panel data: the impact on estimates
of a lifecycle consumption function. J. Appl. Econometrics 7 (3), 243–257.
Okun, M.A., 1994. The relation betweenmotives for organizational volunteering and
frequency of volunteering by elders. J. Appl. Gerontol. 13 (2), 115–126.
ONS, 2007. First release: 2007 Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. National
Statistics, London.
ONS, 2011. Life expectancy at birth and at age 65, England andWales, 1991–1993 to
2008–2010.
ONS, 2012. 2011 Census-Population and Household Estimates for England and
Wales. ONS Statistical Bulletin. Accessible via: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
dcp171778270487.pdf>.
Parker, S., 1980. Older Workers and Retirement. Ofﬁce of Population Censuses and
Surveys. Social Survey Division. HMSO.
Pensions Policy Institute, 2013. Pensions Facts November 2013.
Pettersson, J., 2011. Instead of Bowling Alone? Unretirement of Old Age Pensioners.
Working Paper No. 2011: 14, Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
Ruhm, C.J., 1990. Bridge jobs and partial retirement. J. Labor Econ. 8 (4), 482–
501.
Rust, J.P., 1989. A dynamic programming model of retirement behavior. In: The
Economics of Aging. University of Chicago Press, pp. 359–404.
Saxton, J., 2011. Who Volunteers? Volunteering Trends Based on Government Data
2001–2010. Brieﬁng Report, nfpSynergy.
Schirle, T., 2008. Why have the labor force participation rates of older men
increased since the mid-1990s? J. Labor Econ. 26 (4), 549–594.
Stock, J.H., Wise, D.A., 1990. Pensions, the option value of work, and retirement.
Econometrica 58 (5), 1151–1180.
Thurley, D., 2011. Pension Age: Occupational and Personal Pensions. House of
Commons Library.f Ageing (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2015.05.002
